Introduction
• Evidentials are functional morphemes which encode the information source associated with a given claim (or question):
(1) Tariana (Aikhenvald, 2004, pp. 2-3) Juse José iRida football di-manika-{ /mah/nih/si/pida}-ka 3sg-play-{vis/nonvis/infer/assum/rep}-Rec.Past p = 'José has played football' Evid = Speaker saw/heard/inferred/assumed/was told that p.
A bit more specifically:
(2) Baseline Conception (BC) of Evidentials: A speaker who sincerely utters a declarative sentence with propositional content p and an evidential of type Evid typically:
a. Performs an assertion with content p (or a modalized version thereof).
b. Conveys in some way that the speaker has Evid-type evidence that p.
• While details di↵er, something like this characterization is found in some form in many descriptions of evidentials.
Big question: To what extent does the contribution of evidentials within and across languages match the BC?
This talk: examine an apparent systematic counterexample to the BC -the exceptional status of reportatives.
The exception
• Part (a) of the BC leads us to expect that it should be infelicitous to deny p following an evidential-marked utterance.
• As first shown by Faller (2002) , this expectation is not upheld for Reportatives:
(3) Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002, p. 191) a. Pay-kuna-s (s)he-Pl-Repñ oqa-ma-qa I-Illa-Top qulqi-ta money-Acc muntu-ntin-pi lot-Incl-Loc saqiy-wa-n leave-1O-3 p = 'They leave me a lot of money' Evid = Speaker was told that p b. mana-má not-Impr riki right riku-sqa-yki see-PP-2
ni not un one sol-ta Sol-Acc centavo-ta-pis cent-Acc-Add saqi-sha-wa-n-chu leave-Prog-1O-3-Neg q = '(but) that's not true, as you have seen, they don't leave me one sol, not one cent.'
Evid 1 = Speaker has direct evidence that q.
What to do about it
• Previous authors who have noted this exception have built this into the semantics of the Reportative, i.e. denied that Reportatives fit the BC in (2)
-For example, Faller (2002) claims p is not asserted in (3a), but merely 'presented'
Today:
• Show that, contrary to suggestions in prior literature, data analogous to (3) are extremely widespread.
• Argue that Reportatives are not in fact exceptional in their semantics, i.e. they do fit the BC.
• Provide a pragmatic account of (3) -and similar data cross-linguistically -in terms of pragmatic perspective shift.
-This only arises in Reportatives, since they introduce another perspectival agent, whereas other evidentials do not.
• Flesh out a particular version of the BC which allows for a uniform semantics for (illocutionary) abductive inferential, reportative, and direct evidentials. • . . . but instead that context and details of the propositional content determines which sources of evidence are 'stronger'.
Conclusion: reportative exceptionality cannot simply be attributed to them being the 'weakest' information source.
The exceptional status of reportatives
• As noted in the introduction, the BC in (2) holds that the 'scope proposition', p, is asserted:
• Given this, we expect that an utterance of the form 'p evid and ¬p( evid ) should never be felicitous 2 , just like 'p and ¬p'.
• Surprisingly, however, we consistently can find examples of the form 'p rep and ¬p( dir )' 3 : (6) Cheyenne (Murray, 2010, p. 58) E-hótȧheva-sėstse 3-win-Rep.3sg 'It is said that there was one (person in the airplane) that didn't burn up, but it's not true, they all burned.' 'It's certainly been said that he is an honest man, but he's not honest at all.' (9) Paraguayan Guaraní (Tonhauser, 2013, p. 1) Che-rú= ndaje
Neg-A1sg-think-Neg o-mba'apo-ha A3-work-Nom guéteri. still 'It's said that my father is still working, but I don't think he's still working.' (10) Tagalog (Schwager, 2010, p. 237) 2 The parentheses indicate that variability in whether or not an overt evidential is needed in the second conjunct. Related to this concern is the question of whether sentences with no overt evidential have a phonetically null Direct evidential, conversationally implicate a Direct evidential value, or none of the above. We set this aside here since they run equally afoul of the BC.
3 See Appendix for further such examples from 20 languages.
• Such examples are found across languages whose evidentials di↵er substantially in many ways: • We mention it here since such data have caused previous authors to regard reportative exceptionality as a point of cross-linguistic variation in reportatives 4 .
Looking at all the data, however, we find that the exceptional status of reportatives is best thought of as at least an extremely robust cross-linguistic trend.
In contrast to reportatives, other evidentials -both direct and indirect are consistently infelicitous in these same languages.
• For direct evidentials, (11), we might think of this as being a reflex of their apparent 'certainty'.
• For indirect evidentials such as conjecturals, (12), and abductive inferentials, (13), however, no such explanation is tenable.
-It would be just as plausible in principle for a speaker to have inferential or conjectural evidence that p, yet assert ¬p, as it would in the case of reportatives.
(11) Cheyenne (Murray, 2010, p. 54) #É-hótȧheva-3-win-Dir.3sg
Floyd Floyd naa and oha
Cntré
-sáa-hótȧhévá-he-. 3-neg-win-Mod a -Dir 4 Krawczyk (2012), p. 90 provides an especially clear statement of this claim, claiming a 'Taxonomy of Reportative Evidentiality' whose primary division is between those languages where reportatives are 'exceptional' in our terms and those where they require speaker commitment. Alongside St'át'imcets, Krawczyk mentions only German, despite the example in (35j) and similar examples discussed by Mortelmans (2000) 'Floyd won, I'm sure, but I'm certain he didn't.' (12) Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002, p. 163) #Llave-qa key-Top muchila-y-pi= chá backpack-1-Loc-Conj ka-sha-n be-Prog-3 ichaqa but mana-n not-Dir aqhay-pi-chu there-Loc-Neg #'The keys maybe/are possibly/probably in my backpack, but they are not there.' (13) Central Alaskan Yup'ik (Krawczyk, 2012, p. 22) #Aya-llru-llini -uq, leave-Past-Infer-Ind.3sg
Summary: Cross-linguistically, an evidential-marked claim can be felicitously denied only if its evidence type is reportative.
Semantic accounts of reportative exceptionality
• While the systematicity of reportative exceptionality has gone unrecognized, there are several accounts of reportative exceptionality in particular languages.
Common to all of these accounts is that they treat reportative exceptionality as part of the conventional contribution of the reportative morpheme, i.e. its compositional semantics.
• The earliest such account is Faller (2002) 's account of Cuzco Quechua (CQ) -si.
• Faller (2002) claims that all evidentials in CQ modify the speech act performed by the sentence.
• For the reportative -si, Faller (2002) proposes the following function as its meaning: (14) Faller (2002)'s semantics for CQ -si:
• This function does two things:
1. Replace the default sincerity condition that the speaker believes that p to one where someone else has asserted that p 2. Replace the speech act of assertion with a new speech act Faller dubs a 'Presentation'
• Part 1 encodes the reportative-type evidence while capturing the fact that it is separate from the main propositional content.
• Part 2 is where reportative exceptionality is captured. The speaker merely presents the assertion of another agent rather than asserting it.
Murray (2010) similarly claims that the Cheyenne reportative produces a proposal "to take note of the at-issue proposition, . . . but for the common ground to remain unchanged"
• While such approaches may be able to describe reportative exceptionality, they do not explain why only reportatives diverge from the BC in this way.
• Moreover, since examples like (6-10) are possible in languages with reportatives that di↵er in many other ways, many such semantic approaches would be needed.
A pragmatic alternative
• In this section, we develop a pragmatic account of reportative exceptionality based on the notion of perspective shift.
Pragmatic perspective shift
• Ordinarily, material in the complement of attitude verbs like English think and believe is attributed to the subject of that verb.
• For example, Mary's being an alien in (15) is attributed to John, not the speaker.
(15) John thinks that Mary is an alien.
• Certain kinds of semantic content, however, have been claimed to be invariably attributed to the speaker, even in attitudinal complements.
• For example, Potts (2005) proposes a semantics where appositive relative clauses and expressive epithets are uniformly speaker-oriented:
(16) a. I disagree with the expert who advised the Carnegie family that the father, who is not the breadwinner, does not need life insurance COCA, Davies (2008-) b. The complaint says that the idiot filled in a box labeled "default CPC bid" but left blank the box labeled "content CPC bid (optional)". Harris & Potts (2009) • While such speaker-orientation is typical of appositives and expressives, subsequent authors have claimed that cases of non-speaker-orientation are in fact possible.
• Consider, for example, the following examples from Amaral et al. (2007) :
(17) a. Joan is crazy. She's hallucinating that some geniuses in Silicon Valley have invented a new brain chip that's been installed in her left temporal lobe and permits her to speak any of a number of languages she's never studied. She believes that, thoughtfully, they installed a USB port behind her left ear, so the chip can be updated as new languages are available. Joan believes that her chip, which she had installed last month, has a twelve year guarantee.
b. Scenario: We know that Bob loves to do yard work and is very proud of his lawn, but also that he has a son Monty who hates to do yard chores. So Bob could say (perhaps in response to his partner's suggestion that Monty be asked to mow the lawn while he is away on business): Bob: Well, in fact Monty said to me this very morning that he hates to mow the friggin' lawn.
• Rather than arguing against a speaker-oriented semantics, Harris & Potts (2009) argue that these examples are due to pragmatically-driven perspective shift.
• Clearest support for this claim: non-speaker-orientation is possible even in unembedded cases, provided that the environment is 'perspectivally-rich':
(18) I was struck by the willingness of almost everybody in the room -the senators as eagerly as the witnesses -to exchange their civil liberties for an illusory state of perfect security. They seemed to think that democracy was just a fancy word for corporate capitalism, and that the society would be a lot better o↵ if it stopped its futile and unremunerative dithering about constitutional rights. Why humor people, especially poor people, by listening to their idiotic theories of social justice? [Lewis Lapham, Harper's Magazine, July 1995] (19) I found out recently that my co-worker is a white supremacist. He had never brought it up at work, but after a couple beer at a happy hour, he asked me if I'd be interested in coming to one of his meetings. This was after 15 minutes about how all of the minorities and women in our firm get promotions and raises without deserving them. This guy doesn't know that I'm Jewish, another group he's directed his hate toward (they pull all of the levers in Washington and are keeping white Christians from getting ahead). Is this something I can bring to the attention of my boss? [Dear Prudence, Slate, 11/19/2013] • They show through experimental and corpus work that salience of another perspectival agent in the context is the key factor allowing for non-speaker-orientation of appositives and expressives 5 .
Summary: Otherwise speaker-oriented content can be attributed to other perspectival agents in 'perspectivally-rich' contexts.
Reportative exceptionality as perspective shift
Reportative denials like (20), we claim, involve perspective shift of the same sort.
(20) Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002, p. 191) a. Pay-kuna-s sol-ta Sol-Acc centavo-ta-pis cent-Acc-Add saqi-sha-wa-n-chu leave-Prog-1O-3-Neg q = '(but) that's not true, as you have seen, they don't leave me one sol, not one cent.' Evid = Speaker has direct evidence that q.
• In line with the BC, the conventional discourse e↵ect of (20a) is as follows 6 :
1. Speaker asserts (in some sense) that p
Speaker conveys that their evidence for p is what someone else has told them
• The reportative meaning in 2 makes salient the reporter's perspective, . . .
• . . . which allows for 1 to be interpreted from the perspective of the reporter given a su ciently rich context.
"Context" here includes aspects of the sentence itself which make clear the speaker's di↵ering perspective regarding p.
• Specifically, denials frequently make use of words like really or true, first person attitude reports, NPIs, and other kinds of evaluative language.
• Rather than bare denials, we typically find emphatic denials where the gap between the speaker's view and the reporter's is independently clear.
• Consider, for example, the following contrast from Koring (2013) for Dutch schijnen (similar contrasts exist for Chol =bi as well):
(21) a. Dutch (Koring, 2013, p. 50) • One further such aspect of felicitous denials in at least some cases is prosody (Schwager (2010) for Tagalog daw, Valenzuela (2003) for Shipibo-Konibo -ronki )
In the absence of such a context, however, the reportative is typically used in apparently veridical ways (see Faller (2007) ):
(22) Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2007, p. 6) a. Qusqu-pi Cuzco-Loc hospital-pi hospital-Loc ka-sha-n be-Prog-3
. . .
'She is in Cuzco in [the] hospital.' b. Lima-man-raq-si
Lima-Illa-Cont-Rep yawar-ni-n-pis blood-Euph-3-Add ri-n go-3 'Her blood even went to Lima.'
• Mortelmans (2000)'s claims for German sollen that speaker skepticism must be overtly marked, but that "this possibility is in practice not very frequently made use of".
Evidence from Bulgarian and Turkish
• Parallel to the denials above, the Bulgarian and Turkish perfects of evidentiality allow for denials of the reportative's scope:
(23) Bulgarian (Smirnova, 2013, p. 34) Reportative context: Your best friend, Ivan, has to work hard to support his family. His wealthy uncle died but did not leave him any money. When you speak on the phone with your former classmate, she tells you that Ivan had inherited millions from his uncle. You know that this is not true:
Ostavil leave.Imperf. 'It is reported to the speaker that Sinan fell o↵ the bike, but in fact nothing like that happened.'
• These same forms, however, can also be used in cases of abductive inferential evidence, in which case denials are infelicitous:
(25) Bulgarian (Smirnova, 2013, p. 29) Abductive inferential context: When you discovered a chapter of an unauthored manuscript in Maria's study, you inferred that Maria is writing a book. Later you learned that it is Maria's sister who is writing the book. (Şener, 2011, p. 98) Abductive inferential context: Seda sees Sinan getting up from the ground with his bike and his backpack spread around. Although Seda hasn't see Sinan fall, she infers that he has fallen o↵ the bike: • Such data are expected under our pragmatic account -denials are felicitous only when the context makes salient another perspective, that of the reporter.
• To account for this variability semantically, however, Smirnova (2013) (Bulgarian) and Şener (2011) (Turkish) instead must a covert lexical ambiguity.
Are there really any counterexamples?
• As noted in §3.2, previous literature has regarded reportative exceptionality as a parameter of cross-linguistic variation rather than a consistent pattern.
• The main reason for this are claims that have been made for three languages of the Pacific Northwest:
-St'át'imcets (Matthewson et al. (2007)) -Gitksan (Peterson (2010)) -Nuu-chah-nulth (Waldie et al. (2009)) • On close inspection, however, these authors are actually testing a subtly di↵erent claim -that it is infelicitious for a speaker to assert p Rep if s/he knows p is falseand have regarded denials like (3) as particular instances of this.
• For example, Peterson (2010) cites the following as evidence for this claim in Gitksan:
(27) Gitksan (Peterson, 2010, p. 127) Context: You know John was at work yesterday [It is apparently known that John cans fish for fun when not at work rather than that he works in a fish cannery].
#si-hon= gat =it

Caus-fish=Rep=Pnd
John John k'yoots yesterday '[I heard] John canned fish yesterday.'
• Such data, however, is in fact expected under our pragmatic account:
-No perspectivally-rich environment is established in the context and nothing in the utterance serves to di↵erentiate the speaker's perspective from the reporter's.
• In particular, the speaker's private belief regarding p ought to play no role unless there is reason to believe that this knowledge is somehow publicly available.
Only in St'át'imcets do we actually find a claim that utterances of the form 'p Rep , but ¬p' are infelicitous 7 :
(28) St'át'imcets (Matthewson et al., 2007, p. 22) Context: You had done some work for a company and they said they put your pay, $200, in your bank account, but actually, they didn't pay you at all. There are at least two responses to this data point:
1. This example may not have enough evaluative language to convey the disconnect between the speaker and reporter's perspectives (cf. Chol and Dutch above).
2. St'át'imcets has been claimed by Lyon (2009) to lack perspective shift in a di↵erent case: verbal irony.
• Beyond noting the apparent absence of verbal irony in texts, Lyon constructs scenarios like (29), arguing that speakers consistently propose more literal alternatives, e.g. 'Here is your thing which may or may not actually be a cup': 4 Illocutionary evidentials contribute asymmetric assertions
• In the previous section, we argued for a pragmatic account of reportative exceptionality based on the notion of perspective shift.
• We are now in position to propose a uniform semantics for reportative, abductive inferential, and direct evidentials.
• We focus here on illocutionary evidentials (see Matthewson et al. (2007) for an epistemic semantics which does not incorporate reportative exceptionality)
• Stalnaker (1978) : Common Ground (CG) is the set of propositions which "the speaker is disposed to act as if he assumes or believes that the proposition is true, and as if he assumes or believes that his audience assumes or believes that it is true as well"
• While the CG is a basis for joint action in the conversation, it may diverge from speaker beliefs (a point discussed far more explicitly in Stalnaker (2002) ).
• At the same time, we clearly nonetheless keep track of what other speakers believe, or at least what they are publicly committed to believing.
- Gunlogson (2001) : the analysis of rising declaratives like 'It's raining?' requires reference to the Discourse Commitments of each participant, DC
x
• So, we assume discourse contexts determine an ordered triple:
(30) Discourse components: hX, CG X , {DC x | x 2 X}i • While this basic setup is similar to Gunlogson (2001) , Davis (2009 ), Farkas & Bruce (2010 , we di↵er in that we take both CG X and DC x to be primitives.
-i.e. discourse participants may agree to act as though p is true, even if neither is committed to this being so, publicly or privately.
• An ordinary assertion (i.e. one with no evidentials), then, has two components:
(31) An ordinary assertion by discourse participant A with propositional content p: a. Adds p to DC A . b. Proposes to add p to CG {A,B} on the basis of (31a), subject to acceptance or denial by B.
• We can call such assertions symmetrical since the propositions being added in (31a) and (31b) are the same.
Claim: An assertion with an (illocutionary) evidential makes an asymmetric assertion: (32) An evidential assertion by discourse participant A with propositional content p and evidential requirement Evid: a. Adds Evid(p) to DC A . b. Proposes to add p to CG {A,B} on the basis of (31a), subject to acceptance or denial by B.
• The speaker publicly commits herself to having a certain type of evidence for p, but avoids having to make any commitment to p itself.
• In contrast, the conventional e↵ect of the evidential assertion is to propose that we should continue our conversation acting as though p were true 9 .
• For the reportative, then, the existence of reportative evidence that p is added to DC A and the speaker proposes to add p to the CG:
We return now to cases of reportative exceptionality like (33):
(33) Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002, p. 191) a. Pay-kuna-s sol-ta Sol-Acc centavo-ta-pis cent-Acc-Add saqi-sha-wa-n-chu leave-Prog-1O-3-Neg q = '(but) that's not true, as you have seen, they don't leave me one sol, not one cent.' Evid = Speaker has direct evidence that q.
• Here, the same conventional contribution is present, di↵ering only in that the proposal is attributed to the reporter, not the speaker:
(34) a. Adds Evid(p) to DC A . b. The speaker points out that the reporter would Propose to add p to CG {A,B} on the basis of (31a), subject to acceptance or denial by B.
• As with appositives and epithets, (34b) is content which, semantically, would be attributed to the speaker, but need not be given the perspectivally-rich environment.
Beyond accounting for reportative data (including subsequent denials), this semantics extends readily to other kinds of evidentials, both direct and indirect.
• The only di↵erence in the semantics is that the evidential basis in (31a) will di↵er in the value of Evid.
Conclusion
• Main empirical claim: cross-linguistically, declaratives with reportative evidentials are unique among evidentials in that their scope can be felicitously denied.
• Whereas previous authors have proposed primarily semantic accounts for such facts, we have proposed an account based on pragmatic perspective shift
• While time precludes a more detailed comparison, this approach has a number of empirical and theoretical advantages over semantic alternatives:
Empirical
• Better predictions about the kinds of contexts where reportatives can be used and the role of evaluative language in establishing this context.
• Predicts the complex behavior of 'indirect' evidentials (e.g. Bulgarian, Turkish) without appeal to covert ambiguity.
• Captures the fact that reportatives are typically used in veridical (e.g. as discussed by Faller (2007) ) Theoretical • Explains why reportatives allow for denials while other 'weak' evidentials do not.
• Avoids the need for positing novel speech acts/illocutionary moods, relying instead on tools already needed for assertions cross-linguistically
• Allows for a minimal semantics where (illocutionary) direct, reportative, and abductive inferential evidentials di↵er only in evidence type.
The semantics of reportatives of course di↵er across languages in various dimensions which we have not accounted for here (e.g. the table in §3.2).
• Reportative exceptionality, however, is not one of these, and being due to pragmatic perspective shift, is not part of the data these analyses must account for. (Krawczyk, 2012, p. 34) Aya-llru-uq-gguq leave-Past-3s-Rep . . . Aya-ksaite-llru-yuk-aa . . . leave-Neg-Past-think.that-Ind1s s .3s o 'It is said that she left . . . I don't think that she left.' e. Cheyenne (Murray, 2010, p. 58) E-hótȧheva-sėstse 3-win-Rep.3sg 'It is said that there was one (person in the airplane) that didn't burn up, but it's not true, they all burned.' g. Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002, p. 191) i. Pay-kuna-s (s)he-Pl-Repñ oqa-ma-qa I-Illa-Top qulqi-ta money-Acc muntu-ntin-pi lot-Incl-Loc saqiy-wa-n leave-1O-3 p = 'They leave me a lot of money'
10 The Bulgarian and Turkish data are a bit more complicated in ways to be discussed in §3.3. Evid = Speaker was told that p ii. mana-má not-Impr riki right riku-sqa-yki see-PP-2 ni not un one sol-ta Sol-Acc centavo-ta-pis cent-Acc-Add saqi-sha-wa-n-chu leave-Prog-1O-3-Neg q = '(but) that's not true, as you have seen, they don't leave me one sol, not one cent.' Evid = Speaker has direct evidence that q. h. Dutch (Koring, 2013, p. 49) Context: The speaker's credit card details have been stolen, leading to money being lost from her bank account, and she has contacted the bank to settle this, the speaker might say afterwards:
